Leveraging Defence spending to strengthen Canada’s R&D

Recent world events have demonstrated the multi-dimensional nature of modern warfare, where conflicts are increasingly complex and shaped by a variety of intersecting political, social, technological, and transnational factors. These events have shown that food systems are no longer only an agricultural or economic concern, but central to national security and sovereignty. The weaponization of food exports has become a reality in recent years, with blockades, the destruction of agricultural infrastructure, the imposition of trade barriers, and the redirection of agricultural products shipments used to create political advantage. As well as using control of supply chains as a tool of coercion, such tactics have turned into an instrument of influence across entire regions.

Agricultural commodities have long been used as instruments of influence in global trade. Today, intentional disruption of food supply chains has become a distinct form of geopolitical coercion. For example, the interruption of Ukraine’s grain exports has triggered global shortages and price surges, affecting markets far beyond the conflict zone. While Canada produces about 70% of the food it consumes, it also relies on imports for nearly two-thirds of fruit and vegetables and half of its processed goods. This means that global disruptions to global supply chains, especially in categories where imports fill critical gaps, can lead to higher prices and fewer choices at the checkout, directly affecting daily life for Canadian consumers. Episodes of food supply disruption and prolonged instability in several regions further illustrate how disturbances have an impact in a domain where Canada operates both as an exporter and importer.

The lesson is not lost on major powers. The U.S. has reframed agriculture as an essential pillar of national security, with recent strategies from the Departments of Agriculture and Defense asserting that “farm security is national security,” placing food systems alongside energy and cyber infrastructure as core elements of national resilience. China’s approach is even more explicit. Its new Food Security Law mandates “absolute self-sufficiency” in staple crops, establishes strategic reserves as instruments of sovereignty, and positions agricultural technology development as a lever of national defense. The European Union, for its part, continues to allocate nearly a third of its budget to the Common Agricultural Policy, supporting self-sufficiency. More specifically, its Farm to Fork strategy has elevated food standards into a tool of global regulatory influence. In each case, food is not treated as an afterthought but as a strategic asset.

In contrast, Canada’s approach has remained more fragmented, with food systems policy and national security investments often developed in parallel. This difference in approach is especially notable at a time when the challenges facing Canadian food systems have become more acute.

The federal government only recently moved to make its national school food program permanent, with a commitment to provide meals for up to 400,000 children and permanent funding of $216.6 million annually starting in 2029. Despite this progress, the prevalence of food insecurity remains high and has increased significantly. In 2024, 25.5% of Canadians, including 2.5 million children, lived in food-insecure households, the highest rate recorded in a decade. Grocery price inflation remains elevated at 2.7% nationally, the second highest among G7 countries. Food bank visits have reached record levels, with over 2 million visits in March 2024, a 90% increase compared to March 2019. Recent G7 meetings did not place agri-food policy high on the agenda, and Canadian public investment in agricultural Research & Development (R&D) ranks lowest among the top seven OECD countries.

Over the past decade, public investment in Canadian agricultural R&D has declined significantly, falling from 0.86 billion in 2013 to 0.68 billion in 2022. Private-sector investment has not compensated, remaining modest and narrowly focused. The 2019 Food Policy for Canada, while advancing consumer and sustainability goals, did not frame agriculture as a matter of national security. This has left Canada with a weakened innovation base at a moment when other major powers are positioning food systems at the core of their sovereignty strategies.

Aligning investments, research, and policy across national security and food system domains is essential to close these gaps with an integrated, forward-looking strategy. R&D priorities should reflect not just traditional security but broader community resilience. Historically, defence-motivated research has produced technologies with major civilian benefits, such as GPS, the internet, and satellite imaging. A similarly expansive approach in food could encompass ambitious innovations now under development, such as advanced vertical farming, next-generation food system traceability using blockchain and AI, cellular agriculture, and climate-adaptative crop and livestock technologies. These examples illustrate how adopting a broader definition of security and of what counts as critical infrastructure positions Canada to mitigate risks while leveraging new opportunities in food system resilience.

Singapore’s Research, Innovation, and Enterprise (RIE) plans embed science and technology into a “Total Defence” framework, linking agencies like DSO National Laboratories and A*STAR with food resilience and biosecurity priorities. The ambitious 30 by 30 goal to produce 30% of its nutritional needs domestically by 2030 demonstrates how coordinated, sustained public investment and cross-ministerial collaboration enable innovation spillovers that are intentional and system-wide. Singapore’s dual-use R&D model affirms how clear national goals, institutional alignment, and shared infrastructure can transform complex vulnerabilities into sources of resilience.

Singapore’s approach underscores how intentional design creates systemic advantage. Building on this, several broader lessons apply to Canada. Defence and national security R&D offer the greatest value when mission-aligned with critical sectors, including agri-food. It works best when it builds cross-sectoral teams and public consortia that enable knowledge transfer and systemic solutions.  Finally, it requires evaluation of outcomes across the whole innovation system, not just within the defence sector. These kinds of measures recognize that spillovers can be accelerated by program or policy design.

Canada can strengthen its food innovation and security framework by broadening defence innovation programs with an agri-food lens. Expanding IDEaS (Innovation for Defence Excellence and Security) to include supply chain security, logistics, and sustainable production would increase preparedness for crisis events. Participation in NATO’s DIANA accelerator can be shaped to support dual-use food technologies that improve both defence readiness and domestic resilience.

In a world where food is increasingly used as both a tool of influence and a potential target in global geopolitical rivalry, integrating agriculture into Canada’s national security and defence R&D agenda is fundamental for protecting sovereignty and building systemic resilience. Omitting it would mean ignoring food systems as critical infrastructure vital for long-term stability.