Supporting and Securing Canadian Innovation in Post-Secondary Institutions

Researchers in Canada applying for federal funding must now navigate new or updated research security guidelines and requirements designed to, among other things, help safeguard Canadian knowledge and intellectual property from being misused or stolen.

In an increasingly complex world we must, of course, nimbly adapt to mitigate security risks to research and our researchers. That said, with every additional layer of requirements, post-secondary institutions and researchers face increasing burdens and barriers which have the potential to both limit innovation and valuable knowledge development/commercialization opportunities.

Canada will not be able to fully compete and innovate on a global level if it implements security requirements without robust policy to promote – and adequate funding for – research collaborations with trusted partners in the same innovative technological research areas we seek to protect.

The Argument for Security Requirements

It is helpful to have clear, consistent guidance and requirements about what kinds of technologies and knowledge government is concerned about; this allows stakeholders to better navigate a rapidly evolving risk landscape and mitigate potential issues most effectively. Guidelines also assist researchers in reducing the chance that their research is misappropriated, stolen, or otherwise misused by high-risk actors.

Contrary to widespread belief, the issue of research security is not novel or new. Post-secondary institutions and researchers have been tackling questions related to the subject for some time; those who watched Christopher Nolan’s Oppenheimer, for example, may recall a tense exchange between General Leslie Groves (played by Matt Damon) and researchers working on the Manhattan Project, with the former harshly criticizing scientists for not being discreet or security-conscious enough about the highly sensitive project.

While the Hollywood portrayal of this issue is likely overly dramatic, scientists involved in the project did actually struggle with forced compartmentalization of knowledge in the name of security. While the free flow of ideas likely assisted those involved in the project achieve their goals, a lack of security consciousness likely also ultimately helped the Soviet Union gather valuable knowledge on the project (e.g., through Dr. Klaus Fuchs) and build their own atomic bomb.

Potential Impacts on Competitiveness and Innovation

New guidelines add to existing requirements such as those related to the management of controlled goods, export controls and sanctions. The federal government is not alone in implementing research security requirements; the Ontario and Alberta governments also have their own guidelines, as does the United States. The European Union and the G7 have also expressed concerns on the topic.

Federal requirements to enhance security related to research generated by federal grants are mostly dictated by the National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships, implemented in 2021, and the Policy on Sensitive Technology Research and Affiliations of Concern (STRAC), implemented in 2024. Organizations such as the National Research Council as well as Mitacs have also implemented their own plans.

While most researchers can likely appreciate that clearly identifiable ‘dual use’ technologies (i.e., technology that can be used in both civil and military contexts) are of particular concern, the types of technology the federal government now considers sensitive and that high-risk actors are targeting has significantly expanded. “Sensitive Technology Research Areas” (STRA) identified by the federal government include areas, for example, related to the development of fuel cells, the processing of critical minerals, and advanced manufacturing processes.

A careful review of the STRA list, likely to no one’s surprise, reveals fields of technology that feature prominently in global economic competitiveness and represent major areas of potential future innovation and growth. Canada’s “Budget 2024”, for example, highlights manufacturing, clean energy/clean technologies and next-generation technologies such as quantum computing and artificial intelligence as major focus areas. The STRA list also covers these areas.

While Canada’s research security guidelines and requirements are country-agnostic at their core, they will invariably place pressure on post-secondary institutions and researchers to shift away from potentially sensitive partnerships with high-risk institutions based in or significantly linked to the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

The policy on STRAC specifically highlights 103 “named research organizations” (NROs) that pose significant national security challenges. Eighty-five of these organizations are from the PRC and researchers will not be eligible to receive federal funding if they aim to advance a STRA with the help of a grant and are actively affiliated with, or receiving funding and in-kind support from these NROs.

Post-secondary institutions and researchers in Canada will often need to look beyond the world’s second largest economy if they want to receive federal funds and be perceived by the Government of Canada to be adequately protecting their innovation and knowledge. While there may be a good case to be made to go down this path, one cannot deny that Canadian institutions will lose out on collaborative opportunities and talent that could help propel our economy and innovation agenda forward.

What can we do to address challenges?

If there is to be an emerging global consensus that certain innovative and potentially economically valuable technologies are sensitive and that partnerships with specific entities are too high-risk to continue, we must proceed with prioritizing sensitive collaborations with entities that are considered lower risk. Ideally, countries across the world should be able to establish and maintain a common security standard on research security similar to how ISO 9001 provides certifications on quality management. However, given how nebulous and rapidly evolving the research security space is, it is highly unlikely that a common consensus on research security will be achievable soon.

In the meantime, governments across Canada should establish dedicated financial support for and seek to promote cross-jurisdictional co-investment frameworks that encourage institutions to push innovation barriers in sensitive areas in a way that presents lower security risk. Additional Canadian funding for research in sensitive areas will allow researchers to collaborate more effectively at or close to home. Cross-provincial investment opportunities, for example, would be welcome, as would be a broadening of opportunities such as the National Science Foundation’s Global Centres.

Canada should also seek to leverage existing frameworks, such as its relatively new Indo-Pacific Strategy, to promote innovation partnerships and funding with a broader range of stakeholders. Canada already has strong partnerships with a range of international stakeholders through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); advocating for opportunities that can benefit academia through programs such as NATO’s Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) offers natural pathways to address lost opportunities because of security requirements.

Conclusion

This paper does not seek to challenge the existence of research security requirements. On the contrary, having clearly defined guidelines that are straightforward and predictable to navigate will allow researchers and institutions to better prioritize and focus their attention in certain areas.

The federal government’s financial support for post-secondary institutions to address research security requirements through the Research Support Fund is also welcome in this regard; though as requirements become more onerous, more funding will likely be required for a broader range of institutions (especially small ones).

We must, however, go further and aggressively pursue partnerships and relationships that will eventually help shape Canada’s prosperity for generations to come.

The views reflected in this document are my own and do not express the views of my employer.