From Campus to Capability: How Regional Excellence Can Power Canada’s Defence Future

Canada’s new Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS), unveiled in February 2026, promises to increase government investment in defence-related R&D by roughly 85 percent over the next decade (Department of National Defence, 2026). That is a historic commitment. But without deliberate execution, this investment risks becoming another well-intentioned initiative that falls short of impact. The real test is whether Canada can, and whether it will, translate research strength into strategic capability, and whether the institutions and regions doing that work are treated as genuine partners, not afterthoughts in a federal strategy.

Canada’s innovation challenge has never been a lack of talent. We have world-class researchers and capable firms. The problem, as the Naylor Report identified nearly a decade ago, is what lies between promising laboratory results and scalable, commercially viable capability: the pathway is fragmented, under-resourced, or missing altogether (Naylor et al., 2017). Defence R&D funding, if deployed with intention, could finally begin to close that gap by strengthening commercialisation pathways, de-risking early-stage innovation, and embedding small and medium-sized enterprises into defence supply chains. If not, it risks becoming another round of well-meaning spending that fails to translate into capability.

This is why regionally grounded innovation matters. The Windsor–Detroit corridor, where I serve as Vice-President of Research and Innovation at the University of Windsor, sits at one of North America’s most busiest border crossings, anchored in automotive production, advanced manufacturing, and an increasingly sophisticated cross-border supply chain. It is not merely symbolic, it is functional. The SHIELD Automotive Cybersecurity Centre of Excellence is already developing solutions to protect connected and autonomous vehicles (SHIELD, 2026). This is where artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and next-generation mobility intersect, and it is the kind of dual-use, regionally anchored research that a credible defence strategy should be scaling into a coordinated national network.

A forward-looking DIS must recognise universities as more than training grounds for highly qualified personnel. Universities are engines of fundamental and applied research, and when their partnerships with industry are structured with clear technology roadmaps, shared infrastructure, and real commercialisation pathways, they enable Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) to test, strengthen, and scale their technologies within domestic and allied markets. The new Science and Research Defence Advisory Council, which will include leaders from Canada’s post-secondary institutions, is a welcome step (NRC, 2026). But the proof will be in how deliberately funding reaches the regional ecosystems where this work happens.

One of the most promising opportunities lies in dual-use technologies within clear ethical frameworks. Canada does not need to start from scratch. Automotive manufacturing has long driven innovation in automation and materials science. Agriculture has advanced precision technologies and remote sensing. The health sector demonstrated during the pandemic how research ecosystems can mobilise rapidly in times of crisis. My work in public health, studying falls prevention, aging, and community resilience, has reinforced that systems-based thinking applies directly to national security: integrate knowledge across disciplines, coordinate action across institutions, and build capacity before crisis (Williams-Roberts et al., 2021). Defence R&D should function as an integrative force that strengthens adjacent sectors and amplify prior investments, not operate as a silo.

International experience reinforces this. As a Fulbright Scholar in the United States and a DAAD Scholar in Germany, I have studied innovation ecosystems that approach defence-driven research very differently. What distinguishes effective systems, DARPA’s mission-driven flexibility, Germany’s Fraunhofer Institutes, Israel’s integrated talent pipelines, is not investment alone, but coherence: clear national missions, effective adoption mechanisms, and sustained pathways from discovery to deployment (Bonvillian, 2018; Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft, 2023). Adapting these models to Canada’s context, while embedding SMEs into defence supply chains, will be essential to closing the gap between research strength and strategic capability.

Two priorities should guide implementation. First, invest in regionally anchored innovation hubs aligned with existing sector strengths for example, automobility, advanced manufacturing, cybersecurity, where established ecosystems can accelerate impact and reduce time to results. Second, sustain funding for dual-use research and talent pipelines through university–industry partnerships, including experiential learning, shared infrastructure, and applied research, paired with clear performance metrics and incentives that reward collaboration. At the same time, policymakers must guard against unintended consequences: a significant surge in defence spending risks crowding out investigator-driven fundamental research if the balance is not maintained. Canada’s long-term innovation capacity depends on a healthy ecosystem of basic science alongside mission-oriented programs (Mazzucato, 2018).

Canada’s Defence Industrial Strategy has the potential to bolster both national security and economic growth. The question is no longer whether to invest, but how deliberately that investment is deployed. By aligning funding with emerging technologies, building on regional strengths, learning from global models, and maintaining balance across the research system, Canada can turn this historic commitment into lasting advantage. If done well, this moment will not simply strengthen our defence capacity, it will define our innovation future.

AI Acknowledgment

This editorial was prepared with the assistance of AI-based tools (Claude, Anthropic) solely for editing purposes, including structuring and language refinement. All ideas, arguments, policy perspectives, and analytical framing reflect the author’s own expertise, professional experience, and scholarly judgment. The author assumes full responsibility for the content presented herein.

References

Bonvillian, W. B. (2018). DARPA and its ARPA-E and IARPA clones: A unique innovation organization model. Industrial and Corporate Change, 27(5), 897–914.

Department of National Defence. (2026). Canada’s Defence Industrial Strategy: Security, sovereignty, prosperity. Government of Canada.

Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft. (2023). Annual report 2023. Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft. https://www.fraunhofer.de/en/media-center/publications/fraunhofer-annual-report/annual-report-2023.html

Williams-Roberts, H., Arnold, C., Kemp, D., Crizzle, A., & Johnson, S. (2021). Scoping review of clinical practice guidelines for fall risk screening and assessment in older adults across the care continuum. Canadian Journal on Aging, 40(2), 206–223. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0714980820000112

Mazzucato, M. (2018). The entrepreneurial state: Debunking public vs. private sector myths (Updated ed.). Penguin Books.

National Research Council Canada. (2026, March 9). New programs to support Canada’s Defence Industrial Strategy [News release]. Government of Canada.

Naylor, C. D., et al. (2017). Investing in Canada’s future: Strengthening the foundations of Canadian research (Fundamental Science Review). Government of Canada.

SHIELD Automotive Cybersecurity Centre of Excellence. (2026) University of Windsor. https://www.shieldautocybersecurity.com/